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A GENDERED REFUTATION OF EPIPHENOMENAL NORMS 
THROUGH THE MEDIAN VOTER: A CASE STUDY OF 
INDIA’S CEDAW COMPLIANCE 
Shritha Vasudevan∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article hypothesizes on the reasons behind India’s Declaration to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) Article 5(a) as a manifestation of the intensive compliance deadlock 
over its due diligence obligation which castigates traditional, cultural attitudes 
as responsible for gender-based violence. 
A qualitative analysis of two historical moments when India was confronted 
with an empirical conflict of the CEDAW’s due diligence obligation: the sati of 
Roop Kanwar in 1987 and the Shah Bano judgment in 1985, even prior to its 
CEDAW accession in 1993 is undertaken, to argue that the rational choice 
theory of voting and elections perfectly explains non-compliance. This article 
contests the position that norms are epiphenomenal and makes the case that only 
a study of gendered compliance alters the epistemological lens. This finding 
implies norms could be rationally restructured to make it in nations’ interest to 
comply, simultaneously contesting the post-positivist feminist IR contention that 
eschews the relevance of the mainstream discipline.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most seriously under-theorized and understudied aspect of 
international relations is the set of reasons behind the massive number of 
reservations and declarations to the one of the few existing international legal 
principle on gender-based violence (GBV) known as the due diligence 
obligation to the CEDAW. The due diligence obligation was formulated in 
response to the widespread crimes of GBV during the Balkan conflict in 1992, 
which provided the historical imperative to force the agenda for a right against 
GBV onto the international stage.1  
The promulgation of an international legal principle on GBV has been 
hindered by the massive number of reservations and declarations advanced by 
nation-states. The process of promulgating an international legal principle on 
GBV at the inception of the CEDAW has been termed the biggest deadlock in 
the history of the human rights system.2 When the CEDAW was drafted and 
subsequently promulgated at the United Nations in 1979, governments 
unilaterally invoked their rights under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties3 to unequivocally reiterate that the right against GBV could not prevail 
when it conflicted with the right to freedom of religion.4 The number of 
 
 1 The term “due diligence” in this Article refers exclusively to the CEDAW’s due diligence obligation 
incorporated by way of a General Recommendation of the CEDAW treaty in 1992. It should be noted that this 
principle has not yet been codified into formal international law, making the present study still one of 
international norms. This distinction is made in order to prevent a reference to the other principle of due diligence 
under public international law—the due diligence obligation of states with regard to the jus cogens right against 
torture. The due diligence obligation to the CEDAW has borrowed from the concept of the due diligence against 
torture and has evolved a gendered interpretation of this right stating that states have a duty to prosecute, punish, 
and prevent violence against women, which may be characterized as torture in the private sphere. The text of the 
CEDAW’s due diligence obligation can be accessed at: G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979).  
 2 Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s Reservation Regime under 
Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 605, 605 (2002). 
 3 Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against Women, 6 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 195 (1993); Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and 
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J. L. & RELIGION 106, 107–
08 (1995); See J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY 18–19 (John Gerard Ruggie & Helen Milner eds., 1992); Riddle, supra note 2.  
 4 The Reservations and Declarations to the CEDAW are available at: Rep. of U.N. Meeting of States 
Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women, Sixteenth meeting, 
Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, at 11–12, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/SP/2010/2 (Mar. 1, 2010) [hereafter U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2010/2]. Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Brunei, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Malta, Micronesia, 
Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates have entered Reservations on the conflict of rights frame between religion and gender-based 
discrimination. Id. at 5–28. 
VASUDEVANPROOFS 4/1/2019 2:27 PM 
226 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
reservations to the CEDAW on this ground is the largest to any human rights 
treaty,5 reiterating the charge of scholars of human rights compliance that norms 
are indeed epiphenomenal to international life.6  
This Article argues that this international deadlock that impeded the 
adoption of a principle on GBV in 1979, when the CEDAW was drafted,7 
resurrected itself in 1992 as a legal obstacle when the due diligence was 
promulgated. Governments have refused to support an international legal 
principle that blatantly asks them to interfere in the religious practices that cause 
GBV precisely because the principle conflicts with the right to freedom of 
religion.8 The due diligence obligation has not yet been codified into a formal 
principle of public international law because of this trenchant opposition.9 This 
is the only existing international legal principle that unequivocally states that 
traditional, cultural attitudes emanating from religious practices that cause GBV 
cannot be condoned. The due diligence is thus based on a conflict of rights 
framework—the right to freedom of religion and the right against GBV.10 It is 
based on a liberal conceptualization of the relationship between the right to 
equality and the right against GBV, which does not permit a normative 
determination of the hierarchy between these norms.11 The lack of a normative 
hierarchy has permitted the deadlock to compliance with this principle at the 
international level. This Article submits that nation-states have utilized this 
absence of a normative hierarchy to advance reservations against implementing 
the only existing international norm on GBV.  
As stated above, this international deadlock with regard to compliance is the 
longest witnessed to any treaty on human rights.12 Yet, the causes have not been 
seriously investigated, simultaneously reaffirming the charge by feminist 
International Relations (IR) theorists that gender is accorded scant priority by 
 
 5 Julie A. Minor, Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 137, 144 (1994). 
 6 The role of the epiphenomenal contention as the primary explanation for non-compliance with the 
principles of human rights law will be explained in the next section.  
 7 Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 486, 495 (1990); see Radhika Coomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law: Women’s Rights as 
Human Rights in the International Community, 23 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL., 1249, 1250 (1997).  
 8 Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict 
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 807 (1992).  
 9 Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, Is it Time for a UN Treaty on Violence Against Women?, 22 INT’L. J. HUM. 
RTS. 305, 318–19 (2018); Sullivan, supra note 8, at 796–98.  
 10 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 814. 
 11 Id. at 796. 
 12 Riddle, supra note 2, at 606. 
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the mainstream discipline of IR.13 One of the principal arguments of feminist IR 
theorists first made in 1987 was that the realm of international relations was 
patriarchal, male, and incapable of realizing the interests of women.14 This state 
of affairs contributed to insufficient theorizing of gender within the paradigms 
of the IR discipline. Hence, this strand of feminist IR theorization, as applicable 
to the present argument, will contend that the insufficient theorization on the 
numerous reservations to the CEDAW, and subsequently its due diligence 
principle, is a reflection of the patriarchal realm of IR. 
This Article stands as stark testimony to the fact that a proper analysis along 
a gender axis can reveal the principles on which the relationships between 
nation-states are structured. This Article contends that only this approach 
enables discernment of the conditions that cause or preclude compliance with 
human rights norms. The standard contention by human rights scholars—that 
non-compliance is generated because the due diligence norm and the norm 
privileging the right to gender-based equality over the right to freedom of 
religion is epiphenomenal—will be contested on the basis of the median voter 
theorem. The median voter theorem states that politicians prefer the position 
held by the average voter. This Article argues that the Indian Government’s 
Declaration to the CEDAW was based on its perception of the median voter in 
India. This perception is hypothesized to be male, Hindu patriarchal and firmly 
in favor of the Hindu religious attitudes that cause GBV. An examination of the 
empirical occurrence of the due diligence obligation in India during the sati of 
Roop Kanwar and the parliamentary reversal of Shah Bano is used to make this 
case. As a result, this Article demonstrates the relevance of gender analysis to 
theorization on the relationship between nation-states. Non-compliance with 
human rights norms ensues not because nations consider norms to be 
epiphenomenal. In this significant instance of India’s compliance with the 
CEDAW, the evidence indicates unequivocally that the median voter precludes 
India’s compliance with a principle requiring affirmative state action to redress 
the traditional religious attitudes that cause GBV. Therefore, the empirical 
evidence in this Article indicates that the Indian government’s non-compliance 
with the due diligence obligation is motivated by concerns about its median 
voter, which all governments and politicians unequivocally seek to please rather 
than a perception that the due diligence obligation is epiphenomenal. This 
 
 13 J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING 
GLOBAL SECURITY 18–19 (John Gerard Ruggie & Helen Milner eds., 1992).  
 14 Id. at 6, 10; Susanne Zwingel, How Do International Women’s Rights Norms Become Effective in 
Domestic Contexts? An Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ruhr University Bochum) (on file with author). 
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surely, then, contests the primary argument of the human rights compliance 
literature that norms are epiphenomenal.  
Further, this Article demonstrates the validity of evolving testable 
hypotheses on gender proposed by Keohane15 and partially contests the post-
positivist feminist IR contention16 that the mainstream discipline of IR has 
nothing to offer to resolve the situation of gendered oppression. An ancillary 
effect of the feminist IR contention—that the system of IR is incapable of 
representing the interests of women—is that the system of IR is indeed irrelevant 
to the resolution of the situation of gendered oppression. But, this Article argues 
that the mainstream discipline of political science through its median voter 
theorem has provided the keys to unlock the puzzle of compliance with the due 
diligence principle, the most contested principle of the human rights treaty 
system. This finding is important, particularly to address gendered oppression in 
developing nations where pervasive cultural practices can be linked to GBV, 
such as with a specific cultural practice of the majority Hindu religion in India.17 
Only the liberal sphere, and particularly the instruments of public international 
law, provide an important analytical and substantive tool of redress. The feminist 
IR theorists’ contention that the sphere of IR is irrelevant to the situation of 
gendered oppression negates the validity and relevance of the instruments of 
public international law like the CEDAW that have been valiantly used by 
feminist activists to construct an alternative discourse on the rights of gender-
based equality in countries like India.18 Hence, this Article is also a trenchant 
call to the discipline of feminist IR to reformulate its primary proposition to 
account for an immanent critique of IR. On the basis of a developing nation’s 
experience, the mainstream discipline of IR is indeed relevant to gender. 
To demonstrate the paradigmatic relevance of gender to the discipline of IR, 
the factors precluding compliance with the CEDAW’s due diligence obligation 
will be studied on the basis of the gendered experience in arguably the most 
dangerous country for women: India.19 The rationale for this case selection is to 
 
 15 Robert O. Keohane, Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist 
Theory, 42 INT’L STUD. Q. 193 (1998); Zwingel, supra note 14 at 21. 
 16 Laura Sjoberg, Introduction to Security Studies: Feminist Contributions, 18 SECURITY STUD. 183, 205 
(2009). 
 17 One specific cultural manifestation of this practice that is considered by the current Article is the sati 
of Roop Kanwar, who was just 18-year-old and a bride for six months when she was forcibly immolated on the 
funeral pyre of her husband, Maan Singh.  
 18 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and 
“Personal Laws”, 4 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 181 (2006).  
 19 A global study ranked India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia in the same tier and amongst the worst 
places to be a woman. This study noted the status of India vis-à-vis “surprise.” By demonstrating that the worst 
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understand the reasons causing GBV in a society and civilization that have been 
suffering from intense forms of GBV since 1000 CE. Rather than deploy a 
comparative cross-national analysis, this Article uses the gendered experience 
of a single country as a heuristic for some of the worst forms of GBV. Also, a 
study of the factors precluding compliance with the due diligence principle in a 
country suffering and witnessing some of the worst manifestations of GBV 
hopefully will bring heightened international attention to its nature and 
intensity.20 For the sati of an 18-year-old girl on the funeral pyre of her 21-year-
old husband is now hopelessly lost in the dusty annals of Indian history.21 
Through the examination of non-adherence to the CEDAW’s due diligence 
principle, this Article revisits her last moments and hopes to invoke her memory 
to set into motion the complex process of redressing GBV in Indian society. 
The nature of CEDAW compliance will be examined through the 
immolation of an 18-year-old girl, Roop Kanwar, on the funeral pyre of her 
husband in 1987, in the village of Deeorala, in the north-western state of 
Rajasthan in India, and the Parliamentary reversal in 1985 of the Shah Bano 
judgment by the Supreme Court of India. The latter is a significant moment of 
GBV when a Supreme Court judgment that granted a marginal alimony to a 72-
year-old divorcée was retracted by the liberal, democratic Indian Parliament.22 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of India has recently held Triple Talaq 
to be “void, illegal[,] and ‘unconstitutional,”‘23 the Shah Bano Judgment (taken 
in conjunction with Roop Kanwar’s sati in 1987) is structured on the conflict of 
rights frame of the due diligence obligation.24 The nature and pervasiveness of 
 
position of woman is actually the median voter preference this article negates the construct of surprise by 
empirical social scientific evidence. See Press Trust of India, India Slips 21 Slots on WEF Gender Gap Index 
2017, HINDU (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slips-21-slots-occupy-108th-rank-
on-wef-gender-gap-index-2017/article19966894.ece; see also Belinda Goldsmith & Meka Beresford, Poll Ranks 
India the World’s Most Dangerous Country for Women, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2018), http://www.theguardian. 
com/global-development/2018/jun/28/poll-ranks-india-most-dangerous-country-for-women.  
 20 Belinda Goldsmith & Meka Beresford, Poll Ranks India the World’s Most Dangerous Country for 
Women, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2018), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/28/poll-ranks-
india-most-dangerous-country-for-women. 
 21 Sati refers to the ancient Hindu practice of burning a widow alive on the funeral pyre along with her 
husband’s corpse. This is prescribed in the Hindu religious texts and was routinely carried out in some parts of 
the Indian subcontinent for at least 4000 years. See Dorothy K. Stein, Women to Burn: Suttee as a Normative 
Institution, 4 SIGNS 253, 255 (1978), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173024. 
 22 Zoya Hasan, Minority Identity, Muslim Women Bill Campaign and the Political Process, 24 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 44, 44 (1989).  
 23 Supreme Court Bars Triple Talaq for Six Months. Here’s a 11-Point Primer, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 22, 
2017), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/supreme-court-bars-triple-talaq-till-
parliament-makes-a-law-heres-a-11-point-primer/articleshow/60169892.cms.  
 24 Nawaz B. Mody, The Press in India: The Shah Bano Judgment and Its Aftermath, 27 ASIAN SURV. 
935, 937 (1987). 
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GBV in Indian society, makes it important to understand the factors precluding 
compliance with the due diligence obligation to the CEDAW. These two 
moments unveiled a tension between the right to freedom of religion and the 
right against GBV and provided clues to understand the nature of India’s 
Declaration to the CEDAW’s due diligence in 1993. Hence, the passage of the 
current Supreme Court Judgment does not denude the Shah Bano Judgment of 
its empirical validity vis-à-vis India’s CEDAW compliance. 
It is the submission of this Article that if the Indian government chose the 
right to freedom of religion in both these instances over the right against GBV, 
then its subsequent behavior in 1993 during CEDAW accession privileging the 
right to freedom of religion can be stated to be a reflection of its prior behavior. 
Despite the fact that these two moments are situated immediately prior to India’s 
CEDAW accession, they are historically fortuitous occurrences of the conflict 
of rights of the due diligence obligation permitting reasonable inferences on the 
nature of India’s CEDAW compliance. The due diligence obligation is 
jurisprudentially based on a conflict between the right to freedom of religion and 
the right against GBV.25 The liberal international sphere does not provide for a 
normative determination of the superiority of either norm. In other words, 
religious practices that cause GBV are not deemed problematic under the liberal 
paradigm of international law. This is as the liberal sphere permits the right to 
freedom of religion to co-exist with the right to gender-based equality and the 
right against GBV.  
Methodologically, this Article specifically locates the factors precluding 
compliance in these two moments through the median voter theorem, 
demonstrating their paradigmatic relevance in the present-day context. Hence, 
this Article departs significantly, for reasons explained in the next section, from 
other studies on CEDAW compliance that only study the trajectory of 
compliance after its occurrence. The historical experiences of nations prior to 
compliance matter immensely to understand the true causes behind compliance. 
This Article contends that India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s Article 5(a) is a 
derogation of the due diligence obligation that has been recognized as a principle 
emanating from jus cogens principle of public international law.26 There exists 
 
 25 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 796. 
 26 E.g., David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus 
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 225, 246 (2005); Yakin Erturk (Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences), 15 Years of United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (1994–2009) – A Critical Review, ¶ 66, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (May 27, 2009); accord Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of Torture: The 
Experience of the Committee Against Torture, 15 CUNY L. REV. 293 (2012); see Indira Jaising, The Convention 
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a stream of legal consciousness that the due diligence principle is actually a 
precept of customary international law since it inter alia emanates from the jus 
cogens right against torture.27 It can be conceptualized as a non-derogable norm 
under the canons of public international law. India acceded to the CEDAW in 
1993 with a Declaration to Article 5, which calls on states to “modify the cultural 
practices of men and women and eliminate all customary practices”28 claiming 
that it will implement this principle only to the extent that it does not require 
modification or interference in the religious laws of its minority communities.29 
India is governed by personal status laws on inheritance, succession, 
guardianship, and custody, which discriminate against women.30 A formal link 
between the practices of GBV and the personal status laws has not been 
established. Feminist scholar Parashar contends that one of the principal 
fallacies of the feminist victory in securing a legislation against domestic 
violence in India in 2008 was that it failed to account for the patriarchal religious 
practices reflected in its personal status laws that cause violence.31 The 
legislation merely retained the right of women suffering from GBV to remain in 
their matrimonial homes.32 In other words, this Article argues that Parashar’s 
argument can be restated as follows: the implicit connection between the Hindu 
Personal Laws and the institutions of GBV did not figure in the remedy obtained 
in the domestic violence legislation.  
This Article attempts to craft a feminist voice that demonstrates the intrinsic 
links between the Hindu Personal Laws and the institutions of GBV in India. It 
does so by demonstrating that India’s CEDAW Declaration, structured in terms 
of protecting the Personal Laws of its religious minorities, indirectly protects 
and promotes those majoritarian Hindu cultural traditions that cause violence. In 
effect, there exists empirical interconnections between the patriarchal, cultural 
traditions that cause GBV in Hindu society and the religious norms of gender 
subordination codified in the Hindu Personal Laws. 
 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Realisation of Rights: 
Reflections on Standard Settings and Culture, in WITHOUT PREJUDICE: CEDAW AND THE DETERMINATION OF 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN A LEGAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 9, 9–11 (Meena Shivdas & Sarah Coleman eds., 2010). 
 27 See Jaising, supra note 26; Erturk, supra note 26. 
 28 G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 
18, 1979). 
 29 U.N. CEDAW, 16th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2010/2 (Mar. 1, 2010). 
 30 Archana Parashar, Gender Inequality and Religious Personal Laws in India, 14 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 
103, 103–12 (2008). 
 31 Id. at 107–38. 
 32 Id. at 108. 
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Then, this Article argues that India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s Article 5(a) 
is a substantive derogation of a peremptory norm of public international law: the 
due diligence obligation—in as much as it protects the religious and cultural 
attitudes that cause violence. Scientifically, this can be restated as follows: India 
is implicitly claiming in its Declaration that when it comes to a conflict between 
the right against gender-based discrimination and the right to freedom of 
religion, it unequivocally privileges the latter, because of its median voter. 
Hence, India’s declaration privileging the right to freedom of religion makes this 
an empirical manifestation of the compliance deadlock over the due diligence 
obligation.  
What could be the explanations that account for India’s CEDAW 
Declaration? The standard rejoinder of the human rights compliance literature is 
that this Declaration is to be expected because, after all, norms are 
epiphenomenal: nations only comply with norms that are in their material 
interests.33 This argument has dominated the human rights compliance argument 
and hence applies by default to the study of the nature of compliance with the 
CEDAW’s due diligence.34 As an explanation for India’s Declaration to 
CEDAW’s Article 5(a), this argument would entail the finding that in this 
instance, the due diligence obligation does not appeal to the material interests of 
nations. Scholars of human rights compliance and those who profess the 
epiphenomenal faith would proclaim that India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s 
Article 5(a) is solely motivated by the consideration that the due diligence norm 
is epiphenomenal.35 In other words, India does not find the norm against GBV 
promulgated at the international level to be relevant to its material interests. 
But an examination of two significant historical moments immediately prior 
to CEDAW accession in 1987 and 1985, when India was confronted with an 
empirical conflict between the right against GBV and the right to freedom of 
religion, reveals that the Indian government privileged the right to freedom of 
religion only because of its accurate perception of its median voter as male, 
religious, conservative, and firmly in favor of religious prescription even when 
it conflicts with the right against GBV.36 The raison d’être for the compliant 
behavior of the Indian government, reflected in its subsequent Declaration, was 
 
 33 E.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, 
International Relations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes 
et al. eds., 2002). 
 34 BYERS, supra note 33; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 33. 
 35 BYERS, supra note 33; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 33; U.N. CEDAW, supra note 29, at 11. 
 36 These historical moments will be discussed in further detail later in this Article. 
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an intense concern with appeasing its median voter—not the standard 
assumption that the due diligence principle is epiphenomenal.37 The CEDAW’s 
due diligence generates non-compliance in India not because norms are 
epiphenomenal, but because the government is just responding as a rational actor 
to perceptions of this issue by its median voter.  
In order to demonstrate this, this Article proposes and tests the hypothesis 
that the median voter in India is religious, male, conservative, patriarchal, and 
firmly in favor of religious tradition even when it conflicts with the right against 
GBV. If true, this implies that India’s CEDAW Declaration is a reflection of its 
median preference. There is nothing epiphenomenal about the nature of India’s 
Declaration. When the India government was confronted with the conflict 
between the right to freedom of religion and the right against GBV on two 
occasions immediately prior to CEDAW accession, the median voter dictated 
the government’s preference. Hence, this implies that in 1993 when the Indian 
government was faced with a similar conflict through the CEDAW’s due 
diligence, it sought to appease its median voter preferences reflected in its 
Declaration. An affirmative finding to this hypothesis implies that norms can be 
restructured to make it in the nations’ rational interests to comply, providing the 
keys to unlock the compliance dilemma and secure redress of the endemic 
violence against women, the implications of which will be discussed in the 
conclusion.  
This Article is organized as follows: Section I deals with the rational choice 
theory of public international law and its primary contention that norms are 
indeed epiphenomenal to international life; Section II examines the primary 
principles on the median voter theorem of Anthony Downs; Section III contains 
the hypothesis and the research methodology of the current article; Section IV 
is the empirical section of the article and examines evidence on Roop Kanwar’s 
sati in 1987 and the Shah Bano Judgment in 1985 to argue that these two 
instances are structured on the conflict of rights of the CEDAW’s due diligence. 
The position of the median voter is sought to be traced in these two moments 
through governmental action and the intersubjective societal preference by using 
the principles of Downs. This analysis reveals the nature of the median voter and 
the reasons for the Indian government’s preference of the right to freedom of 
religion over the right against GBV. This Article concludes with the implications 
of these findings on the epiphenomenal contention against public international 
law.  
 
 37 U.N. CEDAW, supra note 29, at 12. 
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I. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
What does rational choice analysis entail when applied to perceptions of 
nations towards public international law? Its primary implication hitherto has 
been that states’ compliance commitments are structured by perceptions of 
international law as epiphenomenal. Since IR’s inception as a discipline, IR 
scholars have viewed the instruments of international law with skepticism38  
which owes its intellectual heritage to Thucydides who is credited with stating 
that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”39 IR 
scholars traditionally have had little time for international law, regarding law as 
an “epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power, 
subject to short-term alteration by power-applying States, and therefore of little 
relevance to how [s]tates actually behave.”40 International law has historically 
just been perceived as “deceitful” language deployed to justify power interests.41 
It is based on the consent of states, which implies domestic matters should 
presumably not be of any transnational concern.42 The lack of an international 
Hobbesist sovereign renders enforceability problematic, demonstrating the 
inefficacy of international law to international life.43 While Slaughter and 
Raustiala argue that this debate has acquired nuance, scholarly discourse 
continues to grapple with the thesis that norms are epiphenomenal.44 In 2002, 
scholars of public international law extensively theorized on rational choice, but 
failed to consider the rational choice theory of voting and elections, from which 
they, nevertheless, abstracted.45 
This premise on the epiphenomenal nature of norms has morphed into 
human rights compliance46 and continues to remain its fundamental animating 
 
 38 Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism between International Law and 
International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 193, 193 (1980). 
 39 Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–38 
(2002), http://www.jstor.org/stable/797642 (last visited Oct 13, 2016). 
 40 BYERS, supra note 33, at 8. 
 41 Jack Landman Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A 
Rational Choice Perspective 3 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Chicago Working Paper Series, John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 108, 2000). 
 42 Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State Sovereignty Sibley Lecture/Keynote Address, 25 GA. J. INT’L. 
& COMP. L. 31, 32–33 (1995). 
 43 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 236 (1979).  
 44 Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 33, at 538, 549. 
 45 In 2002, an entire issue of The Journal of Legal Studies dealt with this question. But the major argument 
only considered the abstraction of rational choice theory to international life. Robert O. Keohane, Rational 
Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S307–S319 (2002). 
 46 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 2600 
(1998). See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 4 (2009).  
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thesis.47 In the absence of competing explanations for the compliance deadlock 
over the CEDAW’s due diligence, this explanation irrefutably asserts itself by 
default. A large part of this contemporary debate has taken place around 
studying CEDAW compliance, also casting doubt on the post-positivist feminist 
IR contention that the mainstream discipline of IR does not take gender 
seriously.  
In Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Hathaway argues 
emphatically that qualitative approaches make it impossible to trace 
relationships between treaty ratification and state practice because the causes of 
compliance cannot be separated from other domestic factors that could elide 
actual causal pathways.48 This Article argues that a qualitative analysis of 
CEDAW compliance in India permits a generalizable, testable proposition that 
has far greater applicability across the South Asian Association of Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) region, Africa, and constitutional democracies among 
the developing nations precisely because of its nuance. Hathaway clumps 
different principles of human rights on “genocide, torture, fair public trials, civil 
liberties and the political representation of women” in an attempt to find 
empirical patterns,49 yet fails. Applying large-N analysis (i.e., studying the 
empirical experiences of many countries for generalizable principles on 
compliance) without contextual detail only reiterates the extant assumption on 
international life that norms are indeed epiphenomenal. This is as large-N studies 
lack the depth and intensity that a single experience of GBV can accurately 
provide. The present Article contends that only a single contextual case study 
provides nuance through the intensity of GBV that demonstrates the proper 
principles on human rights compliance. 
The next study terms human rights as The Paradox of Empty Promises, and 
argues that the “rising gap between states’ propensity to join the international 
 
 47 While the question of the relevance of public international law to the discipline of IR began at the 
inception of IR after World War II, its application to human rights compliance is a relatively new phenomenon 
that has acquired scholarly prominence in the last decade of the twentieth century. The term “human rights” 
refers to the corpus of human rights treaties promulgated in the wake of World War II and comprise importantly 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966; the Convention Against Torture, 1984; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965; the CEDAW; and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 2000. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T. S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 48 Hathaway, supra note 39, at 1939. 
 49 Id. at 1939. 
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human rights regime and to bring their human rights practice into compliance 
with that regime challenges the efficacy of international law and questions the 
authenticity of states’ legal commitment to protect the lives of their citizens.”50 
This study dismisses human rights treaty ratification as mere “window-
dressing,”51 but acknowledges that international global activism exerts an 
independent compliance pull.52 
This was supplemented by Justice Lost: The Failure of Human Rights To 
Matter Where Needed Most, which demonstrates that repressor-states are as 
likely as democracies to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) and the United Nations Convention on the Right Against Torture 
(1987), in its argument that human rights treaties hardly matter to actual human 
rights practices.53  
This paradigmatic position is countered by constructivist scholars who 
demonstrate the conditions under which norms matter. Harold Justice L 
concedes that “[i]nternational human rights law is not enforced . . . because 
human rights norms are vague and aspirational . . . enforcement mechanisms are 
toothless . . . and because national governments lack the economic self-interest 
or the political will to restrain . . .” themselves.54 But nevertheless it develops a 
concept—“transnational legal process”—that has generated some major studies 
on compliance.55 But the question of why norms matter remains to be resolved. 
Further, Beth Simmons argues that the human rights regime has been brought 
into effect by governments themselves, while noting that causal evidence 
remains elusive.56 Despite absence of a quintessential Hobbesist sovereign, 
CEDAW norms are enforced against governments through local activism, 
implying an independent normative pull that influences movements fighting 
gender oppression.57  
One of the defining studies is Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics, which argues that international norms are diffused into 
national life through principled transnational advocates.58 The violence against 
 
 50 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of 
Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1374 (2005). 
 51 Id. at 1378. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights 
Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 410 (2007). 
 54 Koh, supra note 46, at 1399. 
 55 Id. at 1408. 
 56 SIMMONS, supra note 46, at 1. 
 57 Id. at 371–72. 
 58 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
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women’s movement disseminated its norm in terms of existing human rights 
discourse which was its greatest innovation.59  
This theoretical position has been critiqued as a trickle-down approach as 
CEDAW norms developed at the global level are constantly subject to 
“appropriation and interpretation” in local contexts, which is its only mechanism 
of enforceability.60 This argument was enhanced by a full-scale study of 
CEDAW compliance that discovered “[a] range of explanatory factors . . . in 
particular socio-economic prosperity [of a state]; the political system [of a state] 
and the degree to which women’s interests can be represented [in the 
constitution] and the cultural affinity between domestic gender norms and the 
CEDAW principles.”61 Hence, a major factor impeding compliance is that 
international gender norms do not reflect local context.62 But is the conflict of 
rights frame of the due diligence really disparate from national life? The 
empirical evidence presented herein is premised on India’s historical reaction to 
confrontation of the due diligence’s conflict of rights frame even prior to its 
CEDAW accession, contesting the argument that norms are top-down and 
preclude enforceability because of a disjuncture with national life.  
A. Contesting the Epiphenomenal Thesis 
All the existing studies on the CEDAW study compliance after its fact, 
which does not dislodge the epistemological lens that norms are epiphenomenal. 
The intense nature of GBV has resulted in a compliance deadlock for more than 
two decades after the adoption of the due diligence, yet the epistemological lens 
of the compliance literature precludes a solution. The current article departs from 
the earlier studies which have studied compliance after treaty ratification by 
locating the causes precluding compliance at the two historical moments when 
India was confronted with a conflict between right against GBV and the right to 
freedom of religion in 1987 and 1985 prior to CEDAW accession in 1993.63 This 
 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2014), https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JSF8AgAAQBAJ&oi= 
fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Advocacy+beyond+borders&ots=v93U_lmLhb&sig=Pz9mkubMbu4OQlXRd8vQHz3E8Y
Q (last visited Dec 7, 2016). 
 59 Id. at 172. 
 60 Susanne Zwingel, From Intergovernmental Negotiations to (Sub)National Change: A Transnational 
Perspective on the Impact of CEDAW, 7 INT’L. FEMINIST J. POL. 400, 414 (2005). 
 61 Zwingel, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 62 Cf. Zwingel, supra note 14 (explaining that global norms only unfold their value in ongoing and 
collective interpretations and re-interpretations within local practices). 
 63 See Rehan Abeyratne & Dipika Jain, Domestic Violence Legislation in India: The Pitfalls of a Human 
Rights Approach to Gender Equality, 21 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 333, 340 (2012) (describing the 
legislation that India enacted in 1986 creating the new offense of “dowry death,” prohibiting a longstanding 
religious practice that involved violence against women). 
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permits an alteration of the epistemological lens on compliance as it 
demonstrates that the rational choice theory of voting and elections in a 
democracy perfectly explains the causes behind India’s Declaration to 
CEDAW’s Article 5. The following section presents the basic propositions on 
the median voter in a democracy prior to examining the evidence on the Indian 
government at two significant historical moments. 
II. THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM 
One of the basic hypotheses of political science is that majoritarian decision-
making reflects median preferences characterized as a “fundamental principle of 
democracy.”64 The application of economics to public policy-making has helped 
uncover basic empirical patterns of political structure.65 McEachern offers a 
succinct summary of the median voter hypothesis: “[I]f political opinion on a 
particular issue may be viewed as lying in a single dimension, then competition 
among political candidates will force them towards the position held by the 
median voter.”66  
The median voter theorem has its basis in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, and 
states that if there exists two different alternatives in a majoritarian democracy 
and the identity of the preferred alternative is unknown, majoritarian voting 
helps determine the preferred alternative.67 When the population as a whole is 
required to choose and each individual possesses a vote distinct and separate 
from the others and as the number of people eligible to vote increases, the votes 
will coalesce towards the preferred alternative.68 Hence, this implies that voter 
preference on the issue of a conflict between the right against GBV and the right 
to freedom of religion can be determined with accuracy as majoritarian 
preference is expected to coalesce around the preferred alternative.  
In 1929, Harold Hotelling propounded his famous principle of minimum 
differentiation in Stability in Competition and argued that in a two-party 
democracy party ideologies resemble one another and “each party strives to 
 
 64 Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 707, 712 
(2004). 
 65 Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory, 61 PUB. CHOICE 115, 115 
(1989). 
 66 William A. McEachern, Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median-voter 
Hypothesis, NAT’L. TAX J. 129, 129 (1978). 
 67 David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34 (1996). 
 68 Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Individual Errors, and Collective Performance: Empirical Evidence 
on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 5 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 211 (1996). 
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make its platform as much like the other’s as possible.”69 This principle draws 
from economic competition and the tendency of firms to sell identical goods to 
imitate each other as much as possible.70 Rather than differentiate themselves, 
firms tend to locate themselves on a middle position so as to not lose customers 
to other firms selling similar goods. While this theory has been expanded by the 
inclusion of price competition,71 spillover,72 and labor,73 Hotelling’s principle 
still constitutes part of the sacrosanct corpus on which the median voter theorem 
has been propounded within the discipline of political science.74 Hence, political 
parties should exhibit a relatively stable position that reveals the median vote on 
a conflict between the right against GBV and the right to freedom of religion, 
despite proffering ostensibly different ideologies. 
Duncan Black argued that in majoritarian voting systems, the median 
position exerts a pull on all the voters, such that voters with different preferences 
on a single issue will usually converge on the median position.75 This theory 
applies only when voters exhibit a “single peaked” or a single preference out of 
multiple options.76 Therefore, when an issue has just two preferences, 
majoritarian voting converges on and helps determine the median preference. 77 
All of the above theorems led to Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of 
Democracy to explain that political parties and incumbent governments in a 
democracy adopt a preference on an issue, which usually reflects the median 
voter’s position.78 This study remains a basic tenet of the discipline of political 
science, has been uncontested for more than half a century and has “spawned a 
vast literature and has had ramifications throughout the social sciences and in 
allied disciplines such as law and philosophy.”79 
 
 69 Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, in THE COLLECTED ECONOMICS ARTICLES OF HAROLD 
HOTELLING 50, 54 (1990). 
 70 Id. at 41. 
 71 Gabriel A. Picone, David B. Ridley & Paul A. Zandbergen, Distance decreases with differentiation: 
Strategic agglomeration by retailers, 27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 463, 463 (2009). 
 72 J. Myles Shaver & Fredrick Flyer, Agglomeration Economies, Firm Heterogeneity, and Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1175 (2000). 
 73 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY VOLUME 271 (8th ed. 1920). 
 74 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 117 (1957); Bernard Grofman, 
Introduction to BERNARD GROFMAN, INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (1995). 
 75 Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 26–30 (1948). 
 76 Id. at 28. 
 77 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POLIT. ECON. 135, 
150 (1957).  
 78 DOWNS, supra note 74, at 140. 
 79 Grofman, supra note 74 at 1.  
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Downs defines political parties as a group of men seeking to control the 
“governing apparatus” by gaining office in a “duly constituted election.”80 
Politicians are motivated “solely in order to attain income, prestige[,] and 
power” of electoral office, the policies of political parties are created with an eye 
to maximize votes.81 Party ideologies develop solely to offset political 
uncertainties and operate as instruments to maximize votes.82 Downs notes that 
political parties are not agents of any social groups but merely act to maximize 
votes.83 Party ideology is a reflection of the position “an overwhelming portion 
of the electorate agree upon and strongly desire” and “no party can gain by 
opposing passionate majority.”84 Voters are rational and exhibit concern over 
political issues. But they do not display great interest in any overarching 
philosophical Weltanschauungen and hence parties can take ad hoc or temporary 
stands on issues as they arise.85 In fact, “parties are rarely able to adjust their 
ideologies at exactly the speed which conditions warrant.”86 It is to be expected 
that when confronted with a conflict between GBV and freedom of religion, 
politicians will merely act to maximize votes and their adoption of one side of 
the issue is not indicative of any overarching Weltanschauung.87 This 
conceptualization of political parties permits alteration of the conceptual lens of 
the epiphenomenal thesis because it implies parties will take ad hoc positions on 
the due diligence frame and not one universal position.  
For Downs, all issues in a democracy can be broken down into a Left-Right 
scale, which is linear and ranks voter preferences from a zero to a hundred.88 
Each voter’s preference is single peaked.89 Downs draws from Hotelling’s 
principle to state that parties tend to move closer to each other to not lose out on 
votes, and will “converge” on the middle position.90 Parties will not necessarily 
move to a position of moderation but to a position that reflects majoritarian 
preference and can secure the maximum number of votes.91 Hence, if the median 
position on an issue converges on the extreme left or the extreme right with 
 
 80 DOWNS, supra note 74, at 24 
 81 Id. at 28. 
 82 Id. at 111. 
 83 Id. at 97. 
 84 Id. at 98. 
 85 Id. at 98; Weltanschauung is defined as a particular philosophy or view of life; the world view of an 
individual or group, Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/weltanschauung (last 
visited Sep. 8, 2018).  
 86 Id. at 111. 
 87 Id. at 98. 
 88 Id. at 117. 
 89 Id. at 118. 
 90 Id. at 117. 
 91 Id. at 118. 
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voters predominantly clustered at that end, parties will unhesitatingly move 
towards that position on an issue.92  
Further, Downs argues that the basic objective pursued by a democratic 
government is the act of maximizing votes.93 Decision-making by an incumbent 
government is premised on the majority principle94 as incumbent governments 
gain or lose votes on the basis of marginal changes in policy. When crafting 
policy, incumbent governments usually do not make drastic alterations from 
previously existing policies, but just slight changes.95 Voters reject policies not 
on the basis of universalizing philosophies, but merely in terms of how much 
they disfavor the incumbent policy change from its predecessor.96 On an issue 
where there exists only two different alternatives, the government is keenly 
aware of the choice that is going to be reflected in majoritarian preference in the 
next election.97 The government chooses the alternative that the electorate most 
prefers.98 Otherwise, the opposition parties would capitalize on this position and 
take away votes.99 Theoretically a coalition of opposition can hit on a minority 
preference that can defeat the incumbent.100 In this exception, the government 
adopts the minority preference on the issue, implying that incumbents adopt any 
policy that maximizes votes.101 If the opposition party attains power, it is forced 
to adopt majoritarian preferences or face the prospect of being out of office the 
next term due to unhappy voters. Therefore, a passionate majority always 
determines incumbent policies.102 
The next Section demonstrates that India’s CEDAW Declaration was merely 
a reflection of the government responding as a rational actor to an empirical 
conflict of the due diligence, implying this position is not fixed but is always 
subject to marginal change. Hence, theoretically, the government can be made 
to favor policies prohibiting GBV when its electorate perceives a marginal utility 
in this direction contesting the argument that epiphenomenal norms are not 
bound to induce compliance in the foreseeable future. Finally, even though 
Downs’s principle is applicable in the context of a two-party democracy, the 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 52. 
 94 Id. at 54. 
 95 Id. at 53. 
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 97 Id. at 54. 
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 100 Id. at 57. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 64. 
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historical moments of the current article encompasses one electoral tenure of the 
Indian National Congress (INC) making this an irrelevant consideration. 
All these principles demonstrate that it is possible to mathematically discern 
the nature of the median voter on the conflict between the right against GBV and 
the right to freedom of religion by examining the behavior of political parties 
and the incumbent government when they are confronted with an empirical 
conflict of the due diligence.  
The validity of the Downs’ principles animate the discipline of political 
science. This model rendered the previous sociological and psychological 
positions flawed and provided an answer to political science in the language of 
economics, which subsequently revolutionized the study of democracy and 
elections.103 Congleton argues that Down’s simple model of economic decision-
making permits easy transmission of knowledge better than complex models.104 
Particularly, the simple model of the median voter is an “engine of analysis” that 
enables development of hypothesis on complex phenomena, whose simplicity 
provides all that is needed to grasp reality.105 
Down’s ideas have broadly inspired research traditions on the role 
information plays in party competition, voter participation choice and models of 
candidate competition.106 The concept of uncertainty, which conceptualizes the 
voter as an investor, has inspired research on voter shortcuts like media analysis, 
party messages, and campaigns.107 The concept of thresholds has inspired an 
argument on electoral and policy inertia.108 Down’s argument that voting is a 
rationally instrumental act is contested on the basis of empirical observation109 
and group voting.110 Also, researchers have tried to develop models on voter 
 
 103 Grofman, supra note 74, at 2. 
 104 Congleton, supra note 64, at 1. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Grofman, supra note 74, at 4. 
 107 SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER 7, 9–10 (1991).  
 108 Roger Noll, Downsian Thresholds and the Theory of Political Advertising, in INFORMATION, 
PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 37, 43 (Bernard Grofman 
ed., 1995).  
 109 Carole Jean Uhlaner, What the Downsian Voter Weighs: A Reassessment of the Costs and Benefits of 
Action, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 
67, 67 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995).  
 110 Amihai Glazer, Political Equilibrium Under Group Identification, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION 
AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 81, 84 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995). 
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prediction,111 voter behavior,112 the role of cognition in framing salient issues,113 
and presidential voting.114 
But there does not exist any qualitative studies tracing empirical patterns of 
the median voter theorem in the context of gendered compliance in the setting 
of developing nations. Following the footsteps of the major research traditions, 
this Article initiates the conversation about the median vote on gender in the 
context of human rights compliance by testing the median voter hypothesis 
against the due diligence’s conflicts of rights frame in India. 
III. HYPOTHESIS 
Based on the median voter theorem, this Article hypothesizes that when 
confronted with an empirical conflict of rights frame between the right against 
GBV and the right to freedom of religion, the behaviors of the incumbent Indian 
government and political parties should coalesce on the median voter. This 
would accurately reveal the nature of the median voter to be religious, male, 
conservative, patriarchal, and firmly in favor of religious attitudes even when 
they conflict with the right against GBV. It follows that the compliance 
commitment of the Indian government to the CEDAW is a direct continuation 
of its historical reaction when confronted with a conflict between the freedom 
of religion and the right against GBV. Since, the conflict of rights frame is a 
two-dimensional issue, with the right to freedom of religion on the right and the 
right against GBV on the left, it is to be expected that voters in India exhibit a 
preference for one side. Further, in the absence of survey data measuring this 
preference,115 the behaviors of the incumbent government and political parties 
are expected to be accurate proxies for the median position, which contributes 
to a feminist insight that will help argue for a reformulation of the international 
norm on GBV.  
The empirical confrontation between the liberal sphere representing the right 
to freedom of gender-based equality and traditional, cultural attitudes emanating 
 
 111 John Ferejohn, The Spatial Model and Elections, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 107, 108 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995). 
 112 JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING 2 (1984). 
 113 Thomas H. Hammond & Brian D. Humes, “What This Campaign Is All about Is. . .”: A Rational 
Choice Alternative to the Downsian Spatial Model of Elections, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: 
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 141, 142 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995). 
 114 Arthur H. Miller & Martin P. Wattenberg, Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance 
Evaluations of Presidential Candidates,1952-1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 359, 360 (1985). 
 115 The following Section explains the lack of survey data and the rationale for the current Article’s 
research design in greater detail.  
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from religious precepts are potentially generalizable across South Asia to 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka on account of these regions being undergirded 
by a common culture of patriarchy.116 Further, traditional, cultural attitudes 
causing GBV can be witnessed in many jurisdictions in Africa.117 This indicates 
that the median voter theorem hypothesis is generalizable across the developing 
nations and a potential solution to the compliance dilemma over the CEDAW’s 
due diligence. However, the scope of the current Article is limited to India. 
A. Research Methodology 
In the absence of explicit survey data measuring the nature of the median 
voter in India, this Article relies on newspaper reports as primary evidence to 
reconstruct the nature of the median voter vis-à-vis India’s CEDAW 
Declaration. The rationale is that in 1987, the Indian feminist movement was 
still in its incipient state and there does not exist any survey measuring the 
median voter. Arguably the current article only discerns the nature of the median 
voter in the late 1980’s. But the fact that GBV remains an endemic feature of the 
Indian society and there has been no change in the position of the Indian 
government on its CEDAW Declaration points to the possibility that these 
attitudes remain stable till the present day. These reports provide important 
tidbits of information that permit an empirical piecing together of the nature of 
the median voter on the conflict between the right against GBV and the right to 
freedom of religion. Undoubtedly, the present Article requires supplementation 
by an empirical survey designed to capture the attitudes of the present-day 
median Indian voters. In the absence of empirical survey, this Article hopes to 
propound this hypothesis as the first step. Further, in the absence of survey data 
measuring the preference of the median voter in 1985 and 1987, this Article 
deliberately utilizes Downs’ principles explained previously, to qualitatively 
trace the median voter position.118  
This research is hampered by the fact that Indian newspapers do not possess 
electronic news archives prior to 1990. Hence, the primary sources used are 
limited to the international newspaper sources available on ProQuest between 
1986–1988. Also, it is impossible to obtain the posters of the political parties in 
Deorala in 1987, except through the only available feminist investigative 
 
 116 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Human Security and Gender Violence, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4729, 4730 
(2005). 
 117 C. C. Nweze, Domestication of DEDAW: Points to Consider for Customary Laws and Practices, in 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE: CEDAW AND THE DETERMINATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN A LEGAL AND CULTURAL 
CONTEXT 49, 71 (Meena Shivdas & Sarah Coleman eds., 2010).  
 118 DOWNS supra note 74, at 140. 
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journalist report that is available online.119 The report was prepared by the 
Bombay Union of Women Journalists in Deorala in October 1987, a few weeks 
subsequent to Roop’s sati.120 Hence, the feminist case that the median voter is 
Hindu, male, patriarchal, and firmly in favor of the religious attitudes that cause 
GBV will be demonstrated on the basis of Downs’ principles. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MEDIAN VOTER 
IN INDIA? 
In 1987 and 1985, the Indian government was confronted with an empirical 
conflict of the CEDAW’s due diligence between the right to freedom of religion 
and the right against GBV through Roop’s sati and the Shah Bano judgment of 
the Supreme Court of India.121 This Article examines the empirical conflict of 
rights situation in 1987 and then 1985, in order to trace the moments in time that 
were as close as possible to India’s CEDAW Declaration in 1993.  
A. The Intersubjective Patriarchal, Religious Atmosphere That Primed the 
Sati of Roop 
A reconstruction of the moments of Roop’s sati permits discernment of the 
median voter in India through three empirical trails—the intersubjective 
patriarchal atmosphere of the immediate society, the behavior of political parties 
and the incumbent government. This Article argues that these empirical trails 
confirm that the Indian voter is male, religious, patriarchal, and firmly in favor 
of religious attitudes that propagate GBV. First, the intersubjective social 
environment that permitted Roop’s satis to take place publicly in the presence 
of thousands of witnesses shows the pervasive grip of the sanctity of the Hindu 
religious practices that sanction the burning of a widow on the funeral pyre of 
her husband as an act of ultimate wifely chastity. Second, politicians created 
political capital in an attempt to capture a vote-bank. They organized and led 
religious processions that advocated sati, clearly kowtowing to their median 
 
 119 Madhu Kishwar & Ruth Vanita, The Burning of Roop Kanwar, 42 MANUSHI 15, 15 (1987), http://www. 
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pyre of her husband Maal Singh.  
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voter. They could not have done so a priori. This action demonstrates that there 
existed a deep-seated religious patriarchal tradition that rose to the surface at the 
time of Roop’s satis and which was manipulated by the politicians. Third, the 
widespread social support for Roop’s satis prevented the incumbent government 
from openly opposing this religious constituency. The incumbent government 
genuinely feared losing votes if it openly condemned the event, thereby 
demonstrating the domestic rational choice considerations that precluded it from 
privileging the norm against GBV. An exploration of the above trails follows. 
It is impossible to grasp the intensity of the murder of Roop without 
comprehending its intersubjective context. Sati is embedded in the ancient 
Hindu patriarchal traditions that permeate with textual injunctions outlining a 
system of strict sexual control and monogamous chastity,122 mediated with 
misogynistic conceptualizations that link the subordination of women to divine 
self-realization—the ultimate purpose of Hindu metaphysical doctrine.123  
Roop was an eighteen-year-old girl who had been married for just eight 
months to Maal Singh.124 Allegedly, in September 4, 1987, she was forcibly 
consigned to his funeral pyre.125 The death of her husband is attributed to an 
intentional overdose of anti-depressants, covered up as a case of 
gastroenteritis.126 Roop was dutifully present at his deathbed.127 Thereafter, 
details are obfuscated.  
In November 1987, a court was told on pain of perjury that she was “forced” 
into the funeral pyre128 by her brothers-in-law armed with swords, covered to 
her shoulder with firewood.129 A witness recalls what happened at the cremation 
ground, “I saw Roop dressed in bridal make-up. . . . There were about 900 people 
 
 122 Translation of the primary Hindu text that articulates these principles, the Manusmriti and particularly, 
its Chapter IX is available in The Laws of Manu, in 25 SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST (George Bühler trans., 
1886), http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/manu/manu09.htm. 
 123 Stein, supra note 21, at 255.  
 124 Kin Killed Widow, India Court Told, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1987, at 12. 
 125 Uproar Over Rajput “Sati”: Wife Emolates Herself on Husband’s Funeral Pyre, HINDUISM TODAY 
(Dec. 1987), https://www.hinduismtoday.com/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=472 [hereinafter Uproar 
Over Rajput “Sati”]. 
 126 PADMA PRAKASH ET AL., TRIAL BY FIRE: A REPORT ON ROOP KANWAR’S DEATH 3, 8–9 (1987). But see 
JOHN S. HAWLEY, Sati, THE BLESSING AND THE CURSE 7 (1994) (“On September 3, Mal Singh died suddenly 
from a malady that has been variously diagnosed as acute gastroenteritis, a burst appendix, and suicide by 
poisoning.”) 
 127 PRAKASH ET AL., supra note 126, at 3. 
 128 According to Hindu ritual practice a dead corpse is disposed in a funeral pyre constructed of 
combustible material like firewood, sandalwood and the flame has to be repeatedly stoked. Aarti Dhar, Making 
Funeral Pyres Eco-friendly, HINDU, May 15, 2005, at 1. 
 129 Kin Killed Widow, India Court Told, supra note 124. 
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[present]. . . . [i]t took an hour for the preparation of the pyre.”130 This indicates 
that Roop’s family made a public and social decision to consign her to the pyre 
and the word spread, attracting this huge crowd. Roop was reported as swaying 
on her walk to the funeral pyre, strongly indicating administration of opium, 
which is common for sati.131 
The Los Angeles Times reported that “[a]t one point, the fire went out and 
Kanwar tried to free herself . . . but she was forced back. . . . [and] her cries were 
allegedly drowned out by shouts from about 400 villagers who had gathered to 
watch.”132 Witnesses cautiously reported that Roop was heard screaming 
“Mummy, Papa” in English when the fire of the funeral pyre briefly died down 
and had to be relit, which was courteously undertaken by her brothers-in-law 
surrounding the pyre who made her escape virtually impossible.133 
The close relationship of the former British Empire with India has resulted 
in a naturalization and “native” acclimatization of the English language in 
everyday intimate realities like within the family.134 English terms permeate 
seamlessly in everyday Indian culture and are a common form of address.135 The 
fact that Roop used English terms in what was probably a half-burnt and 
unconscious state indicates this could be a normal form of address for her 
parents. This also indicates that Roop was well-educated, and that her family 
was an average middle-class family.136 Yet her family was deeply conditioned 
by the intersubjective patriarchal, Hindu religious atmosphere. Roop was 
married off at the age of eighteen, in accordance with ancient Hindu religious 
prescription that cautions prepubescent marriages as a way of restraining female 
sexuality.137 In the immediate aftermath of Roop’s death, her family members 
affirmed that her death was an “honor.”138 Evidence does not exist to determine 
if this was a voluntary or a coerced statement. Her family was not informed of 
 
 130 Uproar Over Rajput “Sati”, supra note 125. 
 131 Id.; PRAKASH ET AL., supra note 126, at 7. 
 132 Kin Killed Widow, India Court Told, supra note 128. 
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Roop’s apparently “voluntary” decision and were not present at the site of her 
burning.139 The very fact that a well-educated 18-year-old wife was allowed to 
burn in accordance with an ancient Hindu custom demonstrates the pervasive 
grip that these pernicious traditions possess in the Indian psyche. Hence, it is to 
be noted that following the ancient Hindu religious prescriptions mandating 
GBV is an inherent facet of the Indian middle class strongly indicating its 
median connotations.  
This is supplemented by the fact that Roop’s in-laws were perceived to be 
of middle class status.140 The report by the independent feminist inquiry 
attributed this status to Roop’s father-in-law being a school teacher and her 
husband being trained in the sciences.141 Particularly, this report comments on 
the “prosperity” of Deorala, which is comprised of upper-castes including the 
Rajput caste142 to which Roop belonged.143 The village exhibited normal 
consumer goods and signified a marked absence of any debilitating signs of 
poverty common to the subcontinent.144 Hence, Roop’s use of English in her 
final moments viewed in conjunction with the middle class status of her natal 
and patrilineal family indicates that Hindu patriarchy still grips the Indian 
intelligentsia and accurately throws light on the median position. If the educated 
middle class is in the pervasive grip of Hindu patriarchy, then this is an accurate 
indicator on the rest of society.  
Further, Roop’s murder was a public spectacle conducted in the presence of 
thousands of spectators none of whom dared interfere or assist the besieged 
Roop.145 Instead, some villagers kept reiterating the fear of being cursed.146 
Could Roop’s sati have occurred sans social support? The pervasive occurrence 
of dowry deaths with the “tacit approval” of society147 demonstrates the general 
social endorsement of murdering a wife, affording an empirical glimpse on the 
Indian electorate in 1987.148 
On September 10, 1987, a chunari mahatsav, an event where Roop’s bridal 
veil was burned to symbolically commemorate her death, took place in the 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 16; see also HAWLEY, supra note 126, at 116. 
 141 Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 16. 
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 143 Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 16. 
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 146 Uproar Over Rajput “Sati”, supra note 125. 
 147 Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 1. 
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presence of 100,000 spectators despite a governmental ban;149 another report 
estimates it at 300,000.150 “Many politicians offered prayers . . . . They included 
the State Janata Party chief, Kalyan Singh; Rajendra Singh Rathore, state chief 
of Yuva Janata, the party’s youth wing[;] and Deependra Singh Shekhawat, a 
former member of the state Assembly.”151 Plans for building a temple had 
collected $120,000.152 The temple was constructed in November, pulled down, 
but reconstructed.153 The state government of Rajasthan flooded Deorala with 
its officers at the mahotsav, (which was the religious ceremony celebrating the 
sati of Roop), enabling the villagers to pray in peace.154 Hence, the government’s 
lukewarm response to Roop’s sati, failure to exercise due diligence and 
prosecute the accused, and open support of the religious lobby incontrovertibly 
indicates the government’s perception of the religious, conservative, male, 
Indian median voter. On the basis of Downs’s principle, it is possible to conclude 
that if the Indian Government’s behavior was in favor of the religious lobby, 
then incontrovertibly this indicates the median voter to be located at this point.  
On September 22nd, a feminist journalist team visited Deorala and observed 
a group of boys chanting slogans modeled on political slogans at the site where 
Roop’s sati took place.155 Some examples were: “Sati ho to kaisi ho? Roop 
Kanwar ke jaisi ho. Jab tak suraj chand rahega Roop Kanwar tera naam 
rahega.”156 The examples transliterate to mean that Roop’s name will live on 
like the sun and moon. This chant was modeled on a slogan praising the prime 
minister Rajiv Gandhi and Indira Gandhi, “Desh ha neta kaisa ho Rajiv Gandhi 
(X, Y, Z) jaisa ho.”157 Another slogan was based on an anti-cow slaughter slogan 
of a right-wing, Hindu political party: “Desh dharam ka nata hai. Sati hamari 
mata hai.”158 This transliterates as veneration of sati as the primordial mother of 
the Indian nation.  
The report identifies how the regional wings of the major national party, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), pandered to the Rajput lobby by accusing the 
 
 149 Modhumita Mojumdar, Throngs Honor Goddess at Site of Sati, INDIA ABROAD, Nov. 27, 1987, at 30. 
 150 Lata Mani, Multiple Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of Multinational Reception, 13 
WOMEN LANG. 56 (1990). 
 151 Mojumdar, supra note 149. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 22. 
 155 Id. at 16; “Glorification of Sati” Outlawed in India, HINDUISM TODAY (Dec. 1988), https://www. 
hinduismtoday.com/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=583.  
 156 “Glorification of Sati” Outlaws in India, supra note 155. 
 157 Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 17.  
 158 Id.  
VASUDEVANPROOFS 4/1/2019 2:27 PM 
250 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
women of being disrespectful toward Hindu culture, frequenting bars, and living 
in general debauchery.159 It is important to note that this empirical information 
reveals that there exists a pervasive, patriarchal element in society, and the state 
leader is merely drawing upon this frame as opposed to anything else. The fact 
that the state political party feels compelled to conduct rallies condemning the 
activism of women demonstrates that there exists a conflict between traditional 
religious attitudes and the right against GBV. It indicates, however, that the 
Government is pandering to the constituency of traditional religious attitudes. 
In December 1987, a religious leader and former member of Parliament, 
Swami Agnivesh, was arrested for demonstrating against the sati in Deorala.160 
Agnivesh was also challenged to a verbal duel by another religious leader, 
Jagatguru,161 which indirectly implicates societal opinion. A member of 
Parliament who saw fit to agitate against sati reveals his perception of the 
median voter.  
On September 22, 1988, Roop’s father, Maan Singh, and father-in-law, 
Sumer Singh, organized a gathering of 3,000 people; and the Rani Sathi Staal, a 
sati temple in Deorala, collected $12,000 in donations for a public religious 
event commemorating Roop’s death anniversary.162 Despite a Supreme Court 
ban-order, “50,000 members of society including politicians attended” again.163 
The fact that the sati incident provoked “immediate outrage across India”164 and 
engaged the intelligentsia, members of feminist organizations, religious leaders, 
and political leaders demonstrates its salience to the Indian electorate.165  
Could political parties have organized rallies or mobilized support without a 
pre-existing, tacit social base favoring religion over gender equality? Downs’s 
theory supports the finding that political parties and governments perceive that 
the majority preference favors religious tradition and provides a rational 
opportunity to exploit votes. The median voter’s preference for the ancient 
Hindu rationalization of sati could not have been possible unless these 
patriarchal, religious tendencies were deeply entrenched in the Indian psyche. 
Down’s theory lends support to the argument that the incumbent government 
 
 159 PRAKASH ET AL., supra note 126, at 9. 
 160 I. Gopalkrishnan, State Finds Banning Sati Veneration Difficult Task, INDIA ABROAD, Jan. 29, 1988, 
at 11. 
 161 Shantanu Ray, Arrest of Anti-Sati Swami Forestalls A Verbal Duel, INDIA ABROAD, Sep. 9, 1999, at 
27. 
 162 “Glorification of Sati” Outlawed in India, supra note 155. 
 163 Mojumdar, supra note 153; Mani, supra note 149. 
 164 “Glorification of Sati” Outlawed in India, supra note 155. 
 165 Gopalkrishnan, supra note 160. 
VASUDEVANPROOFS 4/1/2019 2:27 PM 
2019] INDIA’S CEDAW COMPLIANCE 251 
and politicians supported the pro-sati lobby only because they accurately 
perceived their median voter to be located there. The prevalent attendance of 
prominent members of society coupled with pervasive public acclamation 
represented by this massive gathering once again incontrovertibly indicates the 
median position to be firmly in favor of the Hindu religious practices that 
motivate GBV.  
Yet another factor that demonstrates the median position of the Indian voter 
is the widespread social activity to glorify sati or create a cult around the 
practice.166 The independent feminist report on Roop’s sati has identified that 
the glorification could be purely attributed to rational politicians exploiting an 
election opportunity.167 This report has empirically identified that politicians 
have attempted to capitalize on this votebank.168 Apart from confirming the 
interpretation of the Indian Government’s reaction to be in accordance with the 
median voter theorem, it appears the feminist report attempts to raise social 
consciousness by arguing that religious attitudes are not entrenched but are 
merely cynically exploited by politicians.169 The feminist report notes that it is 
not rustic ignorance, but conscious exercise of deliberation that kept alive the 
religious traditions that emerged to glorify sati in the aftermath of Roop’s 
burning.170 This Article argues, however, that this report’s hypothesis requires 
reformulation in accordance with Downs’s theory. The evidence reasonably 
supports the idea that politicians only exploit those sentiments that are exhibited 
by the median voter. This then is evidence that this section of the Indian 
electorate exhibits deep reverence for those cultural traditions that openly 
promote GBV? Undoubtedly the politicians did their best to capitalize on the 
fervor, but was it their sole creation? Can politicians create something new in 
the wake of this historical moment? It seems like these religious sentiments were 
deep-rooted and negate the feminist scholars’ contention that rational politicians 
created and then exploited these sentiments. If politicians are assumed to behave 
exactly in the manner posited by Downs, then it follows by implication that they 
are conforming to his model and catering to the median voter’s preference. By 
implication, the politicians’ behavior demonstrates the attitude of the median 
Indian voter, even though the feminist report is an explicit counterargument to 
this idea.171 But presenting a scientific, empirical truth will enable a stronger 
feminist position as it will permit mathematical measurement of the median 
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Indian electorate and bolster the feminist contention that the majority of the 
Indian population exhibits religious attitudes that motivate GBV. 
Further, on November 10, the state government passed an ordinance to 
punish abetment to sati “through cross voting with only 81 of the 115 members 
of the Congress party and 35 of 85 opposition members being present.”172 This 
ordinance became central legislation in 1988.173 A documentary prepared in 
1988, on the anniversary of Roop’s death, characterized the Indian 
Government’s reaction as “deafening silence,”174 indirectly implicating its 
lukewarm legislation and efforts to prosecute the parties accused in Roop’s 
murder.175  
It should be noted that the Indian Government did pass legislation which 
provided a feeble punishment of just upto one year’s imprisonment for aiding 
and abetting  sati.176 But, if norms were epiphenomenal, what caused the Indian 
government to pass any legislation, however lukewarm, to punish abetting sati? 
It seems like the government was independently influenced by the normative 
ideal of gender-based equality. Only this theory seems to explain the puzzle of 
legislation on sati given the government’s contradictory behavior based on its 
perception of the median, thus countering the argument that the norm of gender-
based equality is epiphenomenal. In fact, the government passing legislation on 
this matter lends credence to the interpretation of the Indian government’s 
behavior on the basis of Downs. If feminist activism can induce any change, 
however marginal, in the perception of the common voter, it would be possible 
to influence the reaction of the Indian government. Formulating the compliance 
behavior of governments on the basis of the epiphenomenal contention 
precludes a solution to the compliance dilemma. Only careful consideration of 
gendered compliance enables alteration of the standard contention that all non-
compliance with all norms at all times are epiphenomenal. If at this time, even 
at the height of Indian support for sati, the Indian government felt compelled to 
pass legislation prohibiting the glorification of sati, then a change in the median 
position can induce more substantial change. This possibility implies that the 
democratic government of even one of the worst places to be a woman can be 
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induced to comply with the CEDAW on the basis of its perception of the median 
voter. This finding unequivocally negates the contention that norms are 
epiphenomenal. Rational choice theory of voting and elections helps identify the 
causes behind the apparently epiphenomenal nature of human rights norms, 
simultaneously negating the contention of feminist IR—that the mainstream 
discipline of political science is patriarchal and hegemonic—as one of the 
fundamental principles of political science enables discernment of a solution to 
the world’s largest compliance deadlock and provides a positive thrust for the 
feminist movement.  
B. The Shah Bano Judgment 
In 1985, a Muslim divorcée, Shah Bano, secured marginal alimony from the 
Supreme Court of India against her lawyer-husband who divorced her arbitrarily 
in accordance with the prevailing Sharia law after forty-three years of 
marriage.177 The divorce occurred in 1975 and she appealed to the Supreme 
Court claiming destitution.178 The decision rendered by Chief Justice 
Chandrachud granted alimony of forty U.S. dollars a month, and critiqued the 
patriarchal precepts of Islam.179 This ruling provoked a controversy amongst the 
Muslim religious leaders.180 Millions of Muslims demonstrated across India and 
burnt effigies of the Hindu judge and termed this “blatant interference” in 
religious affairs.181 
Syed Abdullah Bakhari, Imam of Delhi’s largest mosque, immediately 
responded: “We don’t recognize this decision. We will not accept such a direct 
interference with Muslim personal law.”182 This provoked a national furor 
leading to fiery demonstrations against the judgment.183 The Prime Minister, 
Rajiv Gandhi, was reportedly lobbied by feminist activists and religious leaders 
about possible parliamentary action on the Shah Bano Judgment.184 The 
feminists did not want the Prime Minister to take any action upsetting the grant 
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of maintenance to Shah Bano. Whereas the Muslim clerics wanted Parliament 
to pass laws to keep these religious matters out of the purview of the secular 
laws of the land. There was concern in the Prime Minister’s party about en masse 
defections of Muslims who organized their own political party.185 This forced 
Mr. Gandhi to introduce a bill in Parliament which was characterized by a 
newspaper as “grubbing for the Moslem vote is the reverse of the coin that says 
you are being sensitive to Moslem feelings.”186 This statement indicates that the 
government was trying to please the median voter preference for traditional 
religious attitudes on Islam. In other words, the Bill identified the location of the 
median voter in India to be in favor of the traditional, religious attitudes that 
cause GBV, which in itself indicates the median voter’s position. The issue was 
also termed a “major constitutional and political issue,” with one female 
Dandavate politician describing the atmosphere as “charged with communal 
tension.”187 This indicates the widespread median preference on the Shah Bano 
Judgment to be firmly in favor of the traditional atttidues that opposed the grant 
of maintenance by the secular court. This judgment instigated Hindu-Muslim 
riots in New Delhi and led to the downfall of the Indian National Congress in 
the states of Jammu and Kashmir.188 These agitations forced the Gandhi 
government to pass a law in 1985 that subjected alimony to the Sharia, which 
took it out of purview of secular law and effectively annulled Shah Bano’s 
victory.189  
The above analysis indicates that the Indian government caved to pressure 
by its minority religious constituency. The Indian government anticipated that it 
would lose its votes and popularity if it angered the Muslim community. The 
agitations over the Shah Bano Judgment provoked a major crisis in Indian 
society which by itself indicates that it is a major issue in the Indian electorate. 
Hence, implicitly the behavior of the government passing legislation overturning 
the Supreme Court’s grant of maintenance to Shah Bano implies the 
government’s perception of the median voter in India. In the absence of any 
survey data, the behavior of the Government of India and Indian society permits 
inferences on the nature of the median voter in India by using the theory of 
Downs (1954). When confronted with a conflict between gender-equality and 
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religion, the government was compelled to choose the latter because of an 
intense concern with appeasing voter preference that reflects the median position 
on this issue. 
It should be noted that both of the above empirical instances evoked national 
outrage and discussion, implying that GBV provokes heated passion and 
national emotion across India. This gives sufficient ground to claim that India, 
when it issued its CEDAW Declaration in 1993, was confronted with an 
empirical conflict with the due diligence principle and the Declaration was 
merely an extension of government’s behavior as a rational actor. India limited 
its obligations vis-à-vis modifying religious practices only because it did not 
want to offend median sensibilities, giving no indication on the epiphenomenal 
nature of norms.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article argued that two historical moments in 1985 and 1987 created 
an intersubjective reality that influenced the Indian government’s interpretation 
of its CEDAW obligation. Then, it demonstrated that the behavior of the 
government accords more with the rational choice theory of voting and elections 
propounded by Anthony Downs than with any assumptions on the 
epiphenomenal nature of norms. This confrontation is termed “historic” by this 
Article because there is nothing new about this tension, and nothing that 
exclusively privileges international law in capturing this conflict. Global gender 
norms are not fundamentally different from domestic contexts. In the above case 
study, they could be historically witnessed in India. The frame of the due 
diligence principle is based on the material experiences of nations, implying that 
the factors precluding compliance cannot be located in abstract assumptions of 
international law but must be deeply contextual and based on the contingent 
experiences of nations. 
On the two previous historical moments, the Indian government preferred 
the median voter’s position even when it was religious, male, patriarchal, and 
firmly in favor of the religious attitudes that contribute to GBV. Then, it is 
plausible to conclude that when India was confronted subsequently by a similar 
empirical conflict in 1993 with the CEDAW and Article 5(a), which the due 
diligence obligation normatively expanded to include a right to be free from 
GBV, the Indian government issued a declaration protecting cultural traditions 
based on its accurate intersubjective perception of its median voter.190 Hence, 
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VASUDEVANPROOFS 4/1/2019 2:27 PM 
256 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
India’s Declaration to the CEDAW’s Article 5(a) emanates from the Indian 
median voter’s attitude rather than any perception that norms are 
epiphenomenal. The rational theory of voting perfectly explains the 
manifestation of non-compliance. Theoretically, this implies that if the median 
voter’s position undergoes a change through normative infusion of the feminist 
ideals of emancipation, then this might force the Indian government to retract its 
Declaration. Hence, the epiphenomenal contention does not permit the 
restructuring of normative consciousness, on the basis of the right to gender-
based equality, apart from incorrectly characterizing the nature of India’s 
Declaration.  
Further, on the basis of Roop’s case, this Article contends that the median 
voter position influenced India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s Article 5(a). The 
evidence indicates that the rational choice theory of voting and elections 
influenced the government’s decision to issue a declaration located closer to the 
median voter’s position regarding the conflict between the right to be free from 
GBV and the right to freedom of religion. Though India has structured its 
Reservation in terms of the laws of its minorities,191 the evidence on the above 
two historical moments indicates that the Indian median position could be 
characterized as Hindu, male, patriarchal, and firmly in favor of the religious 
traditions that contribute to GBV. This implies that India’s Declaration 
indirectly protects the majoritarian Hindu religious attitudes that are factors to 
GBV despite being structured in terms of the Shari’a. Further, determining the 
median voter position on the continuum between the right to be free from GBV 
and the right to freedom of religion reveals India’s Declaration as an empirical 
manifestation of the compliance deadlock over the Reservation to the CEDAW’s 
due diligence principle. India has indirectly protected the cultural and patriarchal 
practices emanating from religion, which is camouflaged by the language of the 
Declaration itself.  
Perhaps it may be argued that nations fear their electorates in implementing 
the norm as is. This further implies that gender is not irrelevant to state interests 
but very much material to it. If gender considerations can actually prevent 
compliance because of a perception of the median voter position, then this also 
refutes the contention of feminist IR theorists that gender is irrelevant to state 
interests. Gender considerations materially affect the median voter and therefore 
the government’s calculations.  
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This Article contests the IR theorists’ view of gender oppression in 
international relations as patriarchal and hegemonic. It seems that the IR 
theorists’ view only partially explains the causes of non-compliance with the due 
diligence principle. The more cogent explanation rests on a government’s 
perception of its median voter. Postulating the causes of non-compliance in 
terms of the median voter hypothesis also enables the conclusion that the median 
preference is potentially variable and a new median could emerge as a result of 
feminist activism. This principle requires testing across other geopolitical 
regions where GBV is prevalent to determine its veracity. Further, postulation 
of non-compliance in terms of patriarchal IR does not permit variation of this 
preference. It remains fixed and static whereas, postulation in terms of the more 
accurate median voter theorem enables variation in favor of a feminist solution. 
Hence, the tools of mainstream political science are inherently necessary and 
relevant to address GBV.  
Roop was educated in an English-language school professing a connection 
to liberal Enlightenment. Yet, this could not dispel the religious fervor 
surrounding sati attesting to a need for a concerted force like the Government to 
affirmatively re-create a modern, liberal, intersubjective reality that contests the 
eschewing of the state by post-positivist feminist IR theorists. 
The finding on the nature of the median voter as conservative, patriarchal, 
and religious also counters the paradigmatic Hindu right-wing position that the 
Hindu religion is somehow progressive than “retrogressive” Islam. The Hindu 
right-wing political movement asserts that Hinduism possesses progressive 
attitudes towards women because of the presence of codified Hindu laws, which 
makes it more progressive than Islam.192 As a result, this argument is used to 
foster Hindu-Muslim hatred in India which is simmering just below the surface. 
The Partition of India into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan and the Hindu 
Muslim riots in the wake of the Babri Masjid Demolition are evidence of this 
tension.193 Hence, the right-wing Hindu movement firmly believes in the 
existence of a Hindu India solely on the basis of what it claims are progressive 
gendered attitudes within Hinduism. However, feminists in India have 
trenchantly called-out this false allegation by arguing that the Hindu religion is 
in fact more potent towards women than the Sharia.194 This Article furthers this 
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feminist stand by demonstrating that the median voter in India is actually Hindu, 
patriarchal, male and firmly in favor of the Hindu religious traditions that cause 
GBV. Clearly, this finding implies that the Hindu religion does not possess 
progressive atttidues on gender. If anything, it possesses the most retrogressive 
of attitudes favoring GBV..195 The evidence clearly indicates that Hindu 
traditions are retrogressive, ancient, backwards, and openly contribute to GBV. 
Hence, the right-wing Hindutva allegations require restructuring prior to making 
unsound allegations against the minority Islam.  
Finally, this Article stands in testimony of the importance of appreciating 
the intense sufferings that accompany GBV and demonstrates that such concern 
helps illuminate international relations and rational choice theory of voting and 
elections. This Article calls on scholars and researchers of all disciplines and 
schools of thought to identify with the global movement condemning violence 
against women and appreciate its relevance to all disciplines and walks of life, 
and to fight for the total eradication of gender oppression from the hearts and 
minds of the people who perpetrate it. 
 
 
 195 See id. at 1123. 
